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Abstract
A robust prediction from the tax evasion literature is that opti-
mal auditing induces a regressive bias in e¤ective tax rates compared
to statutory rates. If correct, this will have important distributional
consequences. Nevertheless, the regressive bias hypothesis has never
been tested empirically. Using a unique data set, we provide evidence
in favor of the regressive bias prediction but only when controlling for
the tax agencys use of third-party information in predicting true in-
comes. In aggregate data, the regressive bias vanishes because of the
systematic use of third-party information. These results are obtained
both in simple reduced-form regressions and in a data-calibrated state-
of-the-art model.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we provide the rst empirical support of the regressive bias
hypothesis established in the theoretical literature on tax evasion and opti-
mal enforcement.1
The potential for tax evasion requires a distinction between the statu-
tory tax system and the e¤ective tax system. Tax evaders pay less taxes
than they ought to, which implies a wedge between statutory and e¤ective
average tax rates. The regressive bias hypothesis predicts that this wedge is
larger for high-income taxpayers than for low-income taxpayers. Thus, the
distributional properties of the e¤ective tax system may di¤er substantially
from those intended by the tax code.2
The intuition behind this prediction is simple. The tax compliance game
played by the tax agency and taxpayers is a screening problem in which high-
income taxpayers can increase their expected payo¤by imitating low-income
taxpayers. If not all taxpayers can be audited, the tax agency should opti-
mally prioritize tax returns reporting low income. Rather than eliminating
tax evasion altogether, the goal becomes to discourage very low reports by
high-income individuals. In equilibrium, this leads to the decreasing prole
of e¤ective average tax rates. Figure 1(a) illustrates that the wedge between
the e¤ective average tax rate,  e¤, and the statutory tax rate,  , is increasing
in true income. As shown by Scotchmer (1992), the prediction of regressive
bias is theoretically robust. Model variations in the literature consistently
arrive at regressively biased e¤ective average tax rates.
There is one important exception to the regressive bias result: Scotch-
mer (1987) shows that when the tax agency uses population observables
such as gender, age, occupation, employer reported salaries to predict true
incomes, there may be no bias or even progressive bias in the population
as a whole. Specically, she posits that a tax agency can use observables
1See Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Cremer, Marchand, and Pestieau (1990), Sanchez
and Sobel (1993), Erard and Feinstein (1994) and others.
2E¤ective average tax rates are convenient in this context as they summarize in one
statistic equity e¤ects from both evasion/compliance, the increasing propensity to evade
taxes as income increases, and the likelihood of detection and punishment.
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to divide taxpayers into audit groups upon which the agency may condi-
tion its enforcement strategy. In this model, there is regressive bias within
audit groups but likely progressive bias between groups. Consequently, the
regressive bias hypothesis should be reinterpreted as a within-audit-group
phenomenon. Figure 1(b) illustrates the aggregate relationship between ef-
fective average tax rates,  e¤, and true income which is a composite of
relationships within multiple audit groups,  e¤i . Whereas the regressive bias
hypothesis remains valid within audit groups, between audit groups, e¤ective
tax rates may be progressively biased.
[Fig. 1 about here]
The mechanism driving the result is that some low-income taxpayers ben-
et from being high-income individuals within their audit group, while some
high-income taxpayers instead are low-income taxpayers within their audit
group. This reclassication changes the risk of being audited and, hence,
the ex ante e¤ective tax rate. In addition, the tax agency can more e¢ -
ciently target high-income individuals by modifying the allocation of audit
resources. If either third-party reported income or audits are more abun-
dant among high-income taxpayers, progressive bias between groups may
dominate in the aggregate.
Using micro-data on Danish taxpayers, we nd evidence in simple redu-
ced-form regressions that there is a regressive bias within audit groups. Be-
tween audit groups, tax rates are progressively biased whereas, in the aggre-
gate, the two biases approximately cancel out. Thus, our ndings support
the regressive bias hypothesis at the theoretical level but not as an aggre-
gate empirical outcome; specically, our results correspond closely to the
structure of e¤ective tax rates conjectured in Scotchmer (1987).
However, our simple reduced-form analysis does not allow us to identify
the e¤ects from tax evasion and the audit regime on e¤ective tax rates. By
applying theoretical structure to the problem, we show that the empirical
properties of e¤ective tax rates are convinvingly replicated with an agent-
based screening game between a tax agency and taxpayers. To do this, we
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combine insights from two main sources, Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Peder-
sen, and Saez (forthcoming) and Erard and Feinstein (1994). In the former,
the authors collect a uniquely detailed micro-data set, of which ours is a
subset, of a random sample of Danish taxpayers containing pre- and post-
audit incomes and taxes as well as incomes as reported by third parties,
proxies for audit probabilities, etc. They show that third-party reported
income is by far the best predictor of true income compared to other popu-
lation variables. Since the Danish tax agency, SKAT, does in fact use these
information reports extensively in its enforcement e¤orts, they are ideal for
constructing audit groups.3 Using these, we generalize Erard and Feinsteins
within-audit-group model to describe tax evasion and optimal enforcement
both within and between audit groups. We calculate an internally consistent
set of model parameters directly from data and calibrate the tax agencys
budget to match the simulated level of tax evasion to data. We evaluate
the model numerically and nd that applying structure to the data yields
results in close correspondence with our minimal-assumptions reduced-form
estimations. We conclude that (statically optimized) tax evasion and audit-
ing is su¢ cient to generate the observed structure of e¤ective average tax
rates.
In both the reduced-form estimations and model simulation, the covari-
ance structure of e¤ective average tax rates is robust to changes in estimation
method and parameter variations, respectively. In view of this, we predict
that similar empirical relationships would be found in data from any tax
agency that, as the Danish tax agency does, employs a strong signal in
predicting true incomes.
Our results have important implications for policy. Due to the theo-
retical robustness of the regressive bias prediction, it has been argued (e.g.
in Scotchmer 1992) that governments could increase the progressivity of
the income tax code to counter the increasing tax rate bias. However, our
3Other recent papers demonstrate the importance of explicitly considering information
reporting. Phillips (2010) demonstrates the predictive power of third-party reported
information in US data and Pomeranz (2010) demonstrates the general importance of
information as a deterrent of VAT evasion in a sample of Chilean rms.
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results clearly show that population heterogeneity makes such a policy ad-
justment undesirable. Rather, allocating more resources to the tax agency
or collecting more information ex ante is the recommended approach.
We now proceed to the main body of the paper. Section 2 outlines the
Danish tax system and describes the main features of the data. Section 3
evaluates the correlation structure of e¤ective average tax rates empirically.
Section 4 presents our model. Section 5 describes the calibration of para-
meters, outlines the numerical strategy and establishes the correspondence
of data and model-generated output. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix
provides details of the numerical implementation and robustness checks.
2 Data
SKATs tax collection e¤orts rely heavily on information reports by third
parties. During some year t, incomes are earned and by the end of January
in year t+1, SKAT receives information reports from employers, banks and
other entities. By mid-March, SKAT sends out pre-populated tax returns
based on third-party information and other information that they possess
about the taxpayers, such as the taxpayers residence and workplace for
calculating commuting allowances. Subsequently, taxpayers have until May
1 to correct their tax return; in case of no corrections, pre-populated tax
return counts as nal.
After the deadline, SKATs computerized system processes tax returns
and attaches audit ags to returns that the system nds likely to contain
errors. The system is entirely deterministic and does not as such assign a
probability of audit. After the tax returns have been processed, tax examin-
ers assess the agged returns and decide whether or not to initiate an audit
based on the severity of the di¤erent kinds of ags, local knowledge, and
auditing resources. The process is depicted in Figure 2.
[Fig. 2 about here]
If an audit discovers underreporting the taxpayer may pay the taxes owed
immediately or postpone the payment at an interest. If the tax examiner
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views the underreporting as deliberate, the tax agency may impose a ne
according to a ning scheme depending on the assessed intentionality of the
misreporting.
2.1 Experimental Design
The data originates from an experiment conducted by SKAT in the years
20062008, originally analyzed in Kleven et al. (forthcoming). The experi-
ment involved a stratied random sample of 17,764 self-employed individuals
and 25,020 employees and recipients of benets in Denmark. In the present
study, we narrow our focus to a subsample of non-treated employees and re-
cipients of benets and their incomes in the 2006 scal year. The sample is
a stratied random sample of 10,470 selected Danish taxpayers.4 For each
taxpayer, SKAT conducted an unannounced audit after the deadline for
changing the tax return (May 1, 2007). The tax audits were comprehensive
in the sense that SKAT examined all items on the tax return, demanding
documentation for all items on which SKAT did not possess information.
SKAT made a signicant e¤ort to have tax examiners perform homogeneous
audits by e.g. organizing training workshops and distributing detailed audit
manuals. The audits took up 21% of the resources devoted to tax audits in
2007.
Of course, it is unlikely that tax examiners nd all hidden income, such
as that stemming from cash-only businesses and other black market activi-
ties. We focus our attention on the detectable part of tax evasion given the
methods available to SKAT and thus denote our empirical counterpart of
true income detectable income. In what follows, we will write true income
when in fact we mean detectable income.
For each taxpayer, we have income and tax records as reported by third
parties, the nal return as potentially changed by the taxpayer, and the post-
audit return. In addition, the data contains information on the generated
4Note the randomness of our sample as opposed to tax compliance data obtained
from the regular audits that is heavily biased by over-sampling taxpayers who are likely
to have misreported their income in either direction. The sampling strategy involved a
stratication on tax return complexity.
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audit ags that would normally constitute a basis for selecting taxpayers for
audits.
2.2 The Tax System and Tax Compliance in Denmark
The Danish income tax system (in 2006) operates with many di¤erent mea-
sures of income. Here, we will provide the headlines; see Table 1 for details.
Labor market income, i.e. salary, fringe benets and other earned income,
are taxed proportionally by a labor market tax of 8%, while an earned in-
come tax credit (EITC) of 2.5% is provided for labor market income up to
292,000 DKK.5 Capital income is a net concept, and di¤erent tax rates apply
depending on whether net capital income is positive or negative. For most
taxpayers net capital income is negative due to interest payments on mort-
gages. Central government taxes (bottom, middle and top tax) are levied
on the so-called personal income, which, in addition to positive net capital
income, consists of labor market income plus social transfers, and pensions
less labor market taxes and some pension contributions. Central govern-
ment taxes constitute a progressive tax scheme with a personal allowance
and three brackets. Local taxes (county and municipality) are levied on
taxable incomewhich is similar to the central government tax base except
that it allows for negative net capital income deductions and other deduc-
tions such as transport allowances. In this way, Denmark has a version of
the Nordic dual income tax6; negative capital income is taxed at a at rate
whereas positive capital income is taxed progressively just as regular income.
Stock income (dividends and capital gains) is subject to a two-rate scheme
with the high rate setting in at 44,300 DKK.
[Tab. 1 about here]
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample on major in-
come components. The table shows sample means with standard errors of
means in parentheses all numbers are calculated accounting for the strat-
ication scheme. Column (1) presents pre-audit gures measured at the
5Approx. 53,000 USD (1 USD  5.5 DKK).
6For a discussion of the Nordic dual income tax., see e.g. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997).
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deadline, May 1, and column (5) shows gures reported by third-parties.
Self-reported gures (the di¤erence between (1) and (5)) is shown in col-
umn (6). Negative gures mean that taxpayers on average adjust the num-
ber downwards to less than what third-parties have reported. Columns
(2)(4) describe how the gures in (1) were adjusted by the tax examin-
ers during the audit. Columns (3) and (4) split the audit adjustments into
positive (meaning underreporting) and negative (meaning overreporting) ad-
justments, while column (2) holds the average net adjustment, i.e. the sum
of (3) and (4).
The top panel of Table 2 shows gures on net income and total taxes.
The former is dened as the sum of personal income, capital income, stock
income, self-employment income and foreign income less deductions. Pre-
audit net income is on average a little less than 200,000 DKK with a sig-
nicantly positive net adjustment from SKAT of almost 1,700 DKK. The
positive net adjustment reects an asymmetry in the reporting behavior
with underreporting being more than ten times as high as the overreport-
ing. Third-party reported net income is slightly higher than pre-audit net
income mainly due to deductions not included in the third-party reports,
implying a negative self-reported net income.
The bottom panel of Table 2 features a decomposition into main income
components. The asymmetry in the over- and underreporting found for
net income is noticeable for all components. Not surprisingly, the greatest
relative amount of underreporting is found on items least subject to infor-
mation reporting. Self-employment income tops the list with underreporting
amounting to 18.6% of the mean pre-audit self-employment income level fol-
lowed by stock income (6.8%), deductions (2.3%), and the rest being less
than 2%.
[Tab. 2 about here]
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3 Reduced-Form Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the correlation structure of e¤ective tax rates in
the subset of evaders in the population of taxpayers. Specically, we look
at a subset of 905 taxpayers for whom taxes liable were adjusted upwards
following an audit.
We use SKATs audit ag system as a proxy for the probability of an
audit. Specically, we calculate the approximate audit probability, f , by
scaling the audit ags to indicate a probability of audit rather than a binary
do- or do-not-audit value. During normal operations, the ag system always
selects a much larger pool of taxpayers than SKATs budget allows as a
consequence only a subset of the taxpayers selected by the ag system are
actually audited. As we do not know the exact budget size, we scale the
audit probabilities such that the expended budget correponds to auditing
3:45% of taxpayers; this value stems from the calibration of our model to
match the level of evasion observed in the data, cf. Section 5.
In this manner we can calculate the e¤ective tax rate for each individual
as
 e¤ =
f

T + 

T   ~T

+ (1  f) ~T
Y
;
where T and ~T are taxes on true and reported income, respectively, and Y is
true income, and  is the penalty rate on underreported taxes7. We denote
    e¤ the e¤ective tax rate bias where the nominal average tax rate,  , is
dened in the usual way,  = T=Y .
First, we will check whether the correlation between     e¤ and Y is
positive within audit groups (i.e. for a xed level of third-party reported
income). This will serve as evidence of the regressive bias predicted by
theory as the di¤erence between the statutory tax rate and the e¤ective
tax rate would be higher for high-income taxpayers relative to low-income
taxpayers within an audit group.
Conversely, e¤ective tax rates may be progressively biased between audit
7We set  = 1:06 which is an approximate average value for the Danish tax system.
The calculation of this parameter value is documented in Section 5.
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groups, in which case this e¤ect may dominate the within group variation
such that pooled data displays progressive bias. If this is the case,     e¤ is
decreasing in third-party reported income since the di¤erence between the
statutory tax rate and the e¤ective tax rate will be higher for low audit
groups than for high audit groups.
Table 3 shows the results of the simple reduced-form regressions. As
expected, we nd regressive bias within audit groups which is reected by
the signicantly positive coe¢ cient on the true income residual, cf. column
(2), i.e. controlling for third-party reported income, the wedge between the
statutory and the e¤ective tax rates is increasing in income.
[Tab. 3 about here]
Between audit groups, tax rates are instead progressively biased reected
in a signicantly negative coe¢ cient on third-party reported income. This
is also illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the average e¤ective tax rate bias
for 40th fractiles of the distribution of third-party reported income. In the
aggregate, we nd no signicant relation between the e¤ective tax rate bias
and income, cf. column (1), i.e. neither regressive nor progressive bias.
[Fig. 3 about here]
Overall, Table 3 suggests a correlation structure of e¤ective tax rates
as depicted in Figure 1.8 The data supports the theoretical prediction that
e¤ective tax rates are regressive within audit groups. Between audit groups,
there is a progressive bias such that tax rate bias is virtually uncorrelated
with total net income.
To put this into perspective, consider the median taxpayer among tax
evaders. This individual earns approximately 280,000 DKK which was re-
ported by third parties. In addition, he/she claims approximately 25,000
DKK in deductions not reported by a third party resulting in a net income
of 255,000 DKK. Using Table 3 column (2) we can calculate the predicted
8Although there are some outliers in the data, they do not appear to be driving our
results. Applying median regressions, which are less sensitive to outliers, does not quali-
tatively change our results.
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tax rate bias for di¤erent compositions of net income, holding true income
xed. The predicted tax rate bias of the median taxpayer is approximately
2.2 percentage points. If all income was reported by third parties, the tax
rate bias should be 0. If instead there were no income reports by third
parties, the tax rate bias increases to 9.1 percentage points.
4 Theory: A Model of Income Tax Auditing Sub-
ject to Information Returns
To corroborate our interpretation of the observed correlation in the data,
we now proceed to the model of optimal auditing and tax evasion on the
population scale. In Section 5, we calibrate the model to data and show that
its predictions are in close correspondence with the relationships established
in the reduced-form analysis.
Several current theories are capable of analyzing behavior within an audit
group. However, as we wish to analyze aggregate reporting behavior as well
as the tax agencys overall response we need a model that can encompass
several audit groups. To this end, we generalize the model in Erard and
Feinstein (1994) to incorporate a population that is heterogeneous in third-
party income reports.9
Erard and Feinstein (1994) introduce noise in taxpayer reports by in-
corporating the stylized fact that some taxpayers report their incomes hon-
estly even when they have ample opportunity to evade taxes. This is also
the case in our data and is demonstrated in Table 4. Column (1) and (2)
separates taxpayers according to whether or not their entire income was re-
ported to the tax agency by a third party providing both unweighted sample
totals and population weighted sample shares (Panel A). The overall popu-
lation weighted share of compliers, given by individuals not underreporting,
amounts to 94%. To address taxpayers with ample opportunity to evade
taxes, Panel B shows population weighted shares for the subcategories (1)
9We use a di¤erent specication for penalties in the case of detected evasion than
Erard and Feinstein (1994). We model penalties as proportional to evaded taxes rather
than evaded income as this is also the structure of the actual Danish penalty system.
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and (2). Despite having the opportunity to evade taxes, a substantial share
of over 80% of taxpayers with some income not reported by third parties
choose to comply with the tax laws.
[Tab. 4 about here]
As argued in Erard and Feinstein (1994), including inherently honest
taxpayers increases the realism and usefulness of the model: it eliminates
several potential equilibria and leaves them with a unique mixed-strategy
equilibrium prediction. Further, it eliminates the quaint feature of earlier
models that the tax agency would know the true incomes of all taxpayers
before the actual audit. Thus, for each tax return led by a particular
taxpayer, the agency decides whether or not to audit based on the expected
reports of dishonest and honest taxpayers and the resulting probability that
any particular tax return is fraudulent.
A tax agency employs information to predict taxpayers true incomes.
As shown by Kleven et al. (forthcoming), third-party reported income is by
far the most powerful predictor available, making it an ideal candidate for
dening audit groups. However, as this variable, like true income, is intu-
itively best understood as a continuous variable, we allow the tax agency to
choose audit functions contingent on the third-party information of a partic-
ular taxpayer and interpret each level of third-party reported income as an
audit group. Reecting the very low evasion rates on third-party reported
income, gleaned from Table 4,10 we use the simplifying assumptions that
these reports are always correct and are common knowledge to both tax-
payer and tax agency. Overall, the probability that a particular taxpayer is
audited depends both on the predetermined signal, i.e. third-party reported
income, and the endogenously determined reported income.
The overall structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 4.
[Fig. 4 about here]
10For example, of those with their entire income reported by third parties, 98:4% do
not underreport income.
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The tax agency selects the audit regime subject to a budget constraint
without being able to commit to an audit strategy. The audit schedule for
a particular audit group (i.e. conditional on a particular third-party re-
ported income level) is a function of taxpayersreported residual incomes,
i.e. income in excess of third-party reported income, reecting our assump-
tion that third-party reported income is common knowledge. Whereas the
distribution of true incomes, conditional on information reports, is known,
actual true incomes of individual taxpayers are private information. Tax-
payers choose income reports subject to their expectations about the audit
regime. Finally, the actual returns and the audit schedule are realized, au-
dits are conducted, and tax revenue and ex post utilities, as measured by
income net of taxes and any penalty payments, are realized.
4.1 Individual Reporting Behavior
Individual taxpayers have true taxable incomes y and report taxable in-
comes, ~y. Part of true income, z, is reported by third parties and is known
to all parties. Therefore, y = z + u, where u is residual income which can
be positive or negative as it includes both e.g. wages and deductions not
reported by third parties. u is ex ante unknown and can only be ascertained
by the tax agency by conducting a costly audit. We denote the reported
residual x, such that x = ~y   z.
Two facts of the data defy a pure rational-choice model of evasion be-
havior, cf. Table 4: First, a proportion 28:4% of taxpayers have non-zero
residual income, but do not evade taxes; second, a proportion 65:6% of tax-
payers have zero residual income and do not claim unwarranted deductions.
Erard and Feinstein (1994) splits taxpayers into two broad groups, hon-
est and dishonest taxpayers, and assume that these two types di¤er only
in reporting behavior and not in the scope for evasion. This simple pair
of assumptions cannot be directly reconciled with the two above facts as
the ratio of compliant to noncompliant taxpayers is not constant due to a
large mass of correct reports at u = 0. We prefer to remain agnostic as to
whether the 65:6% are inherently honest or merely honest due to practical
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circumstance and keep these taxpayers in a separate group. In the subset of
taxpayers for whom u 6= 0, we denote by Q the fraction of honest taxpayers.
Thus, the conditional density of u given z of honest taxpayers is Q  fujz (u)
while for dishonest taxpayers it is (1 Q)  fujz (u), where fujz (u) is dened
on the domain [u; u]. We denote by Fujz the conditional distribution func-
tion associated with fujz. Finally, we denote by M (z) the mass point of
compliant taxpayers reporting x = 0 given z.
We follow Erard and Feinstein (1994) in assuming that taxes are linear
in income.11 Whereas honest taxpayers always report x = u; we assume that
dishonest taxpayers are risk neutral and maximize expected utility given by
expected income net of taxes and penalties
(1  t) z + p (xjz) [(1  t)u  t (u  x)] + (1  p (xjz)) [u  tx] :
In optimum, the taxpayers choice must satisfy the rst order condition
u = x+
p (xjz)  11+
p0 (xjz) . (1)
It is clear from equation (1) that for p () = 11+ , x = u and evasion is dis-
couraged completely. However, p  11+ is not compatible with equilibrium
when the tax agency cannot commit to the audit regime: if evasion were
completely discouraged, the tax agency would lower p for some x as a cost
saving measure. Thus, in equilibrium p () 2
h
0; 11+

. Furthermore, the in-
centive compatibility constraints on the tax agencys optimization problem
implies that audit functions are decreasing on the domain of income reports
(see Erard and Feinstein (1994) for a detailed demonstration of this point).
Given that p0 (xjz) is negative and p (xjz) < 11+ , increasing the au-
dit probability will, ceteris paribus, lower tax evasion as the risk of get-
ting caught is higher. Lowering p0 (xjz) (increasing its absolute value) also
reduces tax evasion by increasing risk of audit from taxes evaded on the
11Clearly, this an abstraction but not an extreme one. Although the income tax schedule
has three brackets, the average tax rates are much smoother. It would also be possible to
perform the analyses using a full, nonlinear specication of taxes. We do not expect that
the conclusions of this paper would to be substantially a¤ected by this change.
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margin.12
4.2 Optimal Audit Response
The tax agency chooses a continuum of audit schedules p (xjz) for all z. In
this way, the informational aspect of using third-party reported incomes to
predict true income is incorporated into the population-wide equilibrium.13
The audit schedule is chosen to maximize expected revenue (taxes plus nes)Z Z u
x
(p (xjz) [tE (yjx; z) + t (E (yjx; z)  ~y)] + (1  p (xjz)) t~y) dFxjz

dFz
subject to the budget constraint
c
Z Z u
x
p (xjz) dFxjz

dFz 
Z
B (z) dFz  B
where Fxjz is the induced conditional distribution function for reported resid-
ual income, x, given third-party reported income, z; Fz is the marginal dis-
tribution function for z; and B (z) is the proportion of the overall audit
budget, B, allocated to income reports with third-party reported income z.
For each (x; z), the tax agency must choose p to solve
max
p
(p [tE (yjx; z) + t (E (yjx; z)  ~y)] + (1  p)t~y) dFxjzdFz
 c p dFxjz  B (z)dFz
12Taxpayers income returns must also satisfy the second order condition,
p00 (xjz) (x  u) + 2p0 (xjz)  0.
13 In principle, the tax agency could also condition audit schedules on other population
variables such as gender, age, occupation etc. However, as Kleven et al. (forthcoming)
show, these variables are less powerful as predictors. Conditioning on whether the taxpayer
was audited in previous years would complicate matters as it would introduce a dynamic
aspect to reporting decisions. However, as observations on past audits are not employed
in SKATs actual audit scheme, this limitation is unlikely to a¤ect the t of our model.
In addition, the statute of limitations for retrospective audits is limited to 14 months.
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where  is the Langrangian multiplier on the budget constraint. This implies
a point-wise rst order condition
tE(yjx; z) + tE(yjx; z)  t~y   t~y   c R 0 (2)
which is greater than, equal to, or less than zero as p = 11+ , p 2

0; 11+

,
or p = 0. We look for equilibria in which the tax agency chooses a mixed
strategy, such that (2) holds with equality.14
As mentioned, our model is a generalization of the model in Erard and
Feinstein (1994). Specically, our model simplies to theirs if i) z is identical
for all individuals such that Fuz = Fu, ii) log (u)  N
 
; 2

,15 and iii)
B (z)  B. In this case, the problem becomes that of a partial optimization
for a xedB(z) within an audit group. In this simpler version of the model, it
can be shown that the equilibrium audit and evasion functions have a number
of useful properties. Due to the incentive constraints on reporting for high-
income taxpayers, the audit function p (xjz) is decreasing and continuous
in reported income. The reporting function, x (ujz) is strictly increasing
in an upper region of the income domain and constant in a lower region
as some taxpayers pool at the lowest possible report. As the audit and
evasion functions are continuous and di¤erentiable on the interior of the
reporting domain, it is possible to solve for the equilibrium using methods
of di¤erential equations. In addition, as pooling occurs only at the lowest
report, where the di¤erential equation is undened, su¢ cient conditions for
equilibrium can be obtained by checking that the solution to the di¤erential
equation also satises the tax agencys rst order condition for the lowest
report, equivalent to (4) below. In the same way, we can leverage these
properties to solve for the population-wide equilibrium as a range of within-
audit-group equilibria coupled with the optimal budget distribution B (z).16
14The second order condition is @E(yjx;z)
@p(xjz)  0. In our simulations the solutions always
satisfy this criterion.
15Note that this implies that M(z) = 0; 8z in (3).
16Our analysis is complicated by the fact that the mass point of compliant taxpayers at
x = u = 0 induces a singularity in the di¤erential equation (6) given in the Appendix. We
take a standard practical approach and approximate the numerical solution by smooth-
ingthe transition of p (xjz) and p0 (xjz) at x = 0 by interpolating the indicator function
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Thus, the unique equilibrium of the model is described by the collection
of functions u (xjz) and p (xjz) and the budget distribution B (z). Once
p (xjz) is determined, u (xjz) is implicitly dened as the solution to the
taxpayersrst order condition and the tax agency chooses p (xjz) such that
(2) holds with equality. The two equations are connected by the tax agencys
conditional expectation of taxpayerstrue income given the reported income
and third-party reports, E(yjx; z), which is
E (yjx; z) = z + Qfujz (x)x+ (1 Q) fujz (u (xjz))
@u(xjz)
@x u (x)
Qfujz (x) + (1 Q) fujz (u (xjz)) @u(xjz)@x + 1 (x = 0)M(z)
(3)
where 1 () is the indicator function and the derivative @u(xjz)@x is derived from
(1) by di¤erentiating implicitly to get @u@x = 2 +
p00(x)(x u)
p0(x) .
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We can then derive a second order di¤erential equation, (6) in the Appen-
dix, which determines the optimal equilibrium responses p (xjz) and x (ujz)
in audit group z using the expressions for E(yjx; z), u (xjz), @u@x and the tax
agencys rst order condition. However, as some taxpayers pool at the low-
est report, to obtain su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium, we must check the
tax agencys rst order condition at x = u separately as
E (ujx = u; z) =
Qfujz (x)x+ (1 Q)
R upool
u u  fujz (u) du
Qfujz (x) + (1 Q)
R upool
u fujz (u) du
=
c
t+ t
+ u.
(4)
where upool is the residual income at which taxpayers (in this audit group)
begin to pool at the lowest possible report.
As mentioned above, the model contains Erard and Feinstein (1994) as
a special case when attention is limited to a single audit group in which tax-
payers are homogeneous in third-party income reports. To illustrate, Figure
5 depicts the within-group equilibrium for xed B(z) at 10%, log (u) 
N  3:42; 0:32 truncated on [20; 44], Q = 0:4, and t = 0:5.
1 (x = 0) by a piecewise cubic hermite interpolating polynomial. See the Appendix for
details.
17Notice that fxjz (x (u)) = fujz (u (x))
 @u(x;z)@x  = fujz (u (x)) @u(x;z)@x since the SOC
implies that @u
@x
 0 in interior optimum.
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[Fig. 5 about here]
Figure 5(a) shows the audit schedule, p (xjz): It starts in u, is downward
sloping, and terminates in p (x) = 0. This form balances the need to audit
in order to raise revenue with the cost of doing so. The negative slope
reects the need to discourage high-income taxpayers from reporting too
low incomes.
Figure 5(b) shows the amount of evasion as a function of income. The
linear increase in the rst part of the graph reects pooling of dishonest
taxpayers: for a given audit schedule, there will be some income in [u; u],
upool, for which the most protable report is u consequently all taxpayers
with residual incomes u < upool also report x = u. Therefore, there will
be a point mass in the induced distribution of reports, fxjz (x). After this
pooling point, evasion falls rapidly in income until evasion again becomes
increasing in income as the probability of detection becomes su¢ ciently low.
Figure 5(c) shows the e¤ect of the optimal audit schedule on the e¤ective
tax rate, calculated as
 e¤ =
p (x)  (ty + t (y   ~y)) + (1  p (x))  t~y
y
. (5)
The declining prole of p (xjz) together with the high propensity to evade
taxes of high income taxpayers, result in a negative relationship between
the e¤ective tax rate and income. Therefore, high-income taxpayers pay
signicantly less than the statutory tax rate, which, in the case of Figure
5(c), is t = 0:5.
Figure 5(d) shows the induced distribution of incomes and reports. The
top graph is the original income distribution, which in this case is lognormal.
The lower graph shows the distribution of induced reports, i.e. the equilib-
rium response of all taxpayers to the audit schedule. The right part of the
graph is just a scaling of the original income distribution by Q while the
left part is a weighted average of reports by honest and dishonest taxpayers.
The whole graph is somewhat lower than the original income distribution as
there is a mass point of dishonest taxpayers reporting at u, the mass point
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being equal to the area between the graphs.
5 Calibration and Simulation Results
Due to the considerable detail of our data, we can construct a set of parame-
ters that are internally consistent, that is they all derive from the same data
set. We estimate the income distribution and the parameters Q; ; and t,
for each accounting for the stratication scheme, and calibrate the model to
the observed average level of tax evasion by varying the budget parameter,
B. As a normalization, we set the cost of an audit, c, to 1. Thus, by the
tax agencys budget constraint, B can be interpreted as the percentage of
the population of taxpayers that are examined by auditors.
5.1 Calibration
Income Distributions
We use the taxpayer data to construct the income distribution needed in
the model. As income measure we choose net income dened as the sum of
personal income, capital income, stock income, self-employment income and
foreign income less deductions.
First, we allow the mass point of compliant taxpayers at u = 0 to vary
in z, see Figure 6(a). This is important because richer taxpayers are much
more likely to have non-zero residual income than poorer taxpayers. To t
the remaining simultaneous distribution of z and u, we exclude the former
taxpayers and t a mixed lognormal distribution.18 Figure 6(b) depicts
three conditional distributions of u given z in the lower, middle and upper
part of the domain of z.
[Fig. 6 about here]
The exact characteristics of this distribution is documented in the Ap-
pendix. Briey, the variance of ujz is generally increasing in z; however,
18Our results do not appear to alter signicantly if, instead, a kernel estimation is used.
Kernel densities are inconvenient as they allow for troughsof zero density in the interior
of the domain for fujz which may cause our algorithm to fail.
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the taxpayers with very low z seem to have relatively complicated income
compositions resulting in high variance of ujz in the rst audit group.
Honesty
A key model parameter is the fraction of honest taxpayers, Q. In order to
determine an appropriate value of this parameter, we must account for the
fact that, in reality, some taxpayers seem to make reporting mistakes. For
example, in the data some reports are adjusted downward by the auditor
which means that, in the absense of an audit, the taxpayer would have payed
more than intended by the statutory tax system.
We approach the problem in the following manner. First, we assume that
no taxpayer will try to evade taxes on income that is reported by a third
party (this assumption is bourne out in the data as shown in Table 4). Then
we separate the taxpayers into two groups, one containing those whose true
income is entirely reported by third parties so that y = z + u and u = 0,
and the other containing those with some residual income not subject to
third-party reporting, u 6= 0. The second group is then separated according
to whether or not the audit led to a change in their reported income, i.e.
whether or not x 6= u. In other words, we are classifying taxpayers into
groups of compliant (u = x = 0), inherently honest (u 6= 0, x = u) and
dishonest taxpayers (u 6= 0, x 6= u).
Table 4 shows this decomposition. First, note that among taxpayers
whose entire income is reported by third parties, the compliance rate is
97:9%. Among those taxpayers that have some of their income not reported
by third parties, the compliance rate is 80:8%. We can dene honest taxpay-
ers in several ways. The simplest is to include only those reporting correctly.
This denition fails to acknowledge the fact that some taxpayers make re-
porting errors. However, modelling reporting errors is beyond the scope of
this paper. A revenue maximizing tax agency cares not whether revenue
is collected from dishonest taxpayers who intentionally underreport or hon-
est taxpayers who do so by mistake. We classify overreporting taxpayers
as honest and underreporting taxpayers as dishonest. Thus, the number of
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honest taxpayers is the sum of those reporting correctly and those overre-
porting by mistake, which corresponds to Q = 85:2%. The residual consists
of both dishonest taxpayers and taxpayers underreporting by mistake whom
we cannot distinguish.
Penalty
In the same way that we approximate the tax system by a proportional tax
rate, we approximate  by an average penalty rate. In Denmark, evasion
penalties are generally calculated as a factor on taxes evaded; that factor,
however, varies for the amount evaded and the intentionality of evasion as
assesed by the auditor.
In the case of intentional tax evasion, the ne is calculated as one times
evaded taxes under 30,000 DKK and two times the evaded taxes exceeding
30,000 DKK. In the case of gross negligence, the rates are instead 1 times
evaded taxes not exceeding 30,000 and 0.5 times evaded taxes exceeding
30,000.
We use actual compliance ratingsof Danish tax auditors of individual
taxpayers to approximate . As part of SKATs ongoing e¤ort to monitor
compliance, each taxpayer in our data has been assigned a compliance rating,
varying from 0 (severe intentional evasion) to 6 (honest mistakes). These
ratings are further sub-divided into two groups in which ratings below 3
signify intentional evasion and ratings above and including 3 signify mistakes
(also including severe negligence). We take the simplest approach and assign
the rates for intentional evasion to the rst group and the rates for negligent
underreporting to the second group and use the OLS slope coe¢ cent between
approximated penalties and underreported taxes.19 The resulting penalty
rate on underreported taxes is 1:06. We take the view that this value of 
is a lower bound on the appropriate value as it includes neither the cost of
potential prison sentences for severe cases of evasion nor the psychological
19Of course, we calculate  accounting for the stratication scheme. Assigning the
penalty rates for severe negligence only to those for whom the compliance rating is 4 or
5 does not signicantly alter the value of  due to the small number of honest mistakes
classied among underreporting taxpayers.
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cost and e¤ort of defending ones reported tax liability.
5.2 Simulation Strategy
An individual solution to Equation (6) in the Appendix,

p; @p@x

, that cor-
responds to a particular z is found numerically using methods of Ordinary
Di¤erential Equations (ODE) as initial value problems. The solver is ini-
tialized using p(x) = 0 and p0(x) =

1
1+

= (u  x) ; where x  x (u). Thus,
starting at the end-point of the equilibrium-path audit probabilities, a nu-
merical solver nds values in steps until u is reached, ensuring that the
taxpayersas well as the tax agencys optimality conditions are met for re-
ports x 2 (u; x]: However, since a positive mass of taxpayers are pooling
their reports at x = u, the expectation E(ujx; z) is not di¤erentiable in this
point. Therefore, we check that the tax agencys FOC is met in the pooling
point separately after nding some candidate solution, cf. (4).
The di¢ culty in identifying equilibria in this model stems from a pri-
ori indetermination of  and x: we must satisfy E(ujx = u; z)   u = ct+t
which depends on both variables. Our solution method searches the space
of possible (; x) for candidate solutions, for each checking whether the tax
agencys optimization constraints are satised on the entire domain of x,
until satisfactory solutions are found. The optimal budget allocation, which
in our simulations is always interior, equates marginal revenue with respect
to the audit budget across levels of z.
While mathematically and intuitively z is naturally understood to be
a continuous variable described by the simultaneous distribution of u and
z, we approximate the optimal allocation of the total audit budget on the
domain of z by constructing a representative grid of values by sub-dividing
taxpayers into 40th fractiles. We provide detailed documentation of the
numerical implementation in the Appendix.
We have estimated t; c; ; Q and income distributions from data. Thus,
the remaining free parameter is the budget value, B. Since the mean level
of evasion is inversely proportional to total tax revenue, it is monotonically
declining in B. To calibrate B, we use the estimated income distribution
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to simulate a population of taxpayers: we vary B until the average level of
evasion matches the level observed in the data. The unique resulting value
is B = 0:0345, corresponding to population-wide audit rate of 3:45%. This
compares favorably to the reported audit rate in Kleven et al. (forthcoming)
of 4:2% as this gure includes both wage earners and self-employed (for
whom the average audit rate is high) and as SKAT auditors during normal
operations do not check returns as thoroughly as in the experiment.20
5.3 Simulation Results
As mentioned, we calibrate the model to the level of evasion in the data.
Figure 7 shows the average level of income evaded for 40th fractiles of the
distribution of third-party reported income in data and simulations.
[Fig. 7 about here]
Although the level of evasion in data and simulations necessarily match,
it is reassuring that the correlation between evasion and income in the sim-
ulations is not substantially di¤erent from the data.
The match between data and simulations may seem trivial as it is im-
posed by the calibration procedure. However, in the context of the economic
literature on tax evasion, being able to match a model to moments of the
data for reasonable parameter values is novel. For example, Alm, McClel-
land, and Schulze (1992) argue that observed evasion is too low to be ex-
plained by actual audit and penalty regimes. Our analysis lends support to
the argument of Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod (2007)
that third-party reporting and tax-return-dependent audits can explain a
substantial part of observed evasion. However, in accordance with Feld and
Frey (2002), our analysis also requires us to take into account the substantial
number of taxpayers that report honestly despite incentives to evade.
20This is not to imply that SKAT is cavalier in its audits, but rather that the audit
ag system is intended to alert auditors to misreports in particular line items of taxpayers
tax return, rather than to the return as a whole. Thus, it may make sense to audit a
return only partly rather than investigate line items for which no signal of evasion has
been received.
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Budget Allocation
The optimal budget allocation across audit groups is depicted in Figure 8(a).
Generally, the prole is increasing in z reecting the fact that higher-income
taxpayers nd it relatively easier to evade taxes. The exception is the lowest
audit group that is subject to a high audit intensity; perhaps because of a
relatively high incidence of welfare fraud and black market income.
[Fig. 8 about here]
To compare, Figure 8(b) depicts the share of taxpayers with audit ags
across audit groups. Interestingly, it exhibits the same qualitative features
as the simulated optimal budget distribution, namely high audit intensities
at the very bottom and top audit groups and an otherwise increasing prole
in z.
E¤ective Tax Rate Bias
As in Section 2, we calculate the bias of e¤ective average tax rates,     e¤,
this time based on the simulated data. As Figure 9 shows, the simulated
tax rate bias matches the data, both with respect to the order of magnitude
and the progressivity between audit groups. Considering that the model is
calibrated only to the mean level of evasion, the correspondence of e¤ective
tax rates in the data and the model is excellent.
[Fig. 9 about here]
In addition, the progressive bias between audit groups approximately
cancels out the regressive bias within audit groups in the aggregate.21 Thus,
the model both quantitatively and qualitatively replicates the correlation
structure of e¤ective tax rates exhibited by the data.
21 In fact, the model suggests a slight progressive bias in the aggregate whereas in the
data the corresponding bias is not distinguishable from zero.
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Robustness
The structure of tax rate bias within and between audit groups in the sim-
ulations is highly robust as we document in the Appendix. Although the
magnitude of regressive and progressive bias is inuenced by our key cal-
culated parameters, t, , and Q, keeping xed the income distribution and
overall audit budget, the e¤ects are relatively small and in no case do the
the biases change signs (Table 6). Further, the biases respond symmetri-
cally to changes in parameter values in the sense that a parameter variation
that increases the regressive bias within audit groups also increases the pro-
gressive bias between audit groups leaving the aggregate tax bias relatively
una¤ected.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper highlights the importance of information in tax enforcement. In
doing so, we nd evidence in favor of the regressive bias hypothesis and
Scotchmers (1987) conjecture that it is crucial to distinguish regressive bias
within an audit group from aggregate or between-group variation. Using
highly detailed data we nd evidence suggesting that, whereas e¤ective tax
rates are regressively biased within audit groups as theory suggests, this
relationship is largely negated by a progressive bias between audit groups
induced by the distribution of audit resources and third-party information.
As a result, no systematic bias can be detected in pooled data.
However, as emphasized by the literature, distortions may be substan-
tial in settings in which third-party reporting is less comprehensive. Stan-
dard optimal auditing literature seems to suggest that regressive bias can be
countered simply by adjusting marginal tax rates across the board. How-
ever, once we allow for population heterogeneity of behavior and income
composition, this is no longer feasible. Our results suggest an obvious pol-
icy to ameliorate these distortions: increasing the share of income reported
by third parties will reduce both the extent of evasion and the regressive
bias in tax enforcement.
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From a theoretical point of view, including third-party reported infor-
mation and the likelihood of honest reporting conditional on the income
composition is crucial in understanding tax evasion. We take a practical
approach and do not as such try to explain the the large number of honest
taxpayers in the data. Rather, we analyze whether the correlation struc-
ture in e¤ective tax rates is consistent with that generated by an optimizing
tax agency and expected utility maximizing tax evaders. We nd that, for
reasonable parameter values, our model can replicate the extent of observed
evasion as well the subtle correlation structure of e¤ective tax rates. In
addition, our results indicate that the Danish tax agency employs a dis-
tribution of resources across audit groups that is surprisingly similar in key
respects to the optimal distribution generated by the model. All in all, there
seems to be a role for both standard economic theory and behavioral exten-
sions in explaining tax evasion behavior. In particular, future behavioral
research is needed to clarify whether the assumption of exogenous honesty
is an appropriate simplication.
The correlation structure of e¤ective tax rates seems robust: it is gen-
erated by our realistically complex model as well as in Scotchmer (1987).
Furthermore, while variations in parameters change the level of average tax
rate bias as well as the rate of progressivity between audit groups, in no vari-
ations is the correlation structure of e¤ective tax rates qualitatively di¤erent
from our baseline simulation. Thus, we are condent that similar empirical
relationships would be found in data from any tax agency that, as SKAT
does, employs a strong signal in predicting true incomes.
A natural objection to the model we employ is the lack of general equilib-
rium e¤ects, for example feedback into labor market choices. As experience
shows (e.g. Pencavel, 1979), adding such features to the model complicates
the analysis substantially, which in our setting may be prohibitive. However,
as argued in Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) in the Danish
context and also Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and others, because short
run responses to e¤ective tax rates are likely to be small due to e.g. labor
market rigidities, adjustments occur on the intensive margin rather than the
extensive margin. In addition, dynamic aspects are likely to be negligible as
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due to the limited retrospectivity of SKATs audit scheme and the restric-
tive statute of limitations on retroactive penalties for tax evasion. While
beyond the scope of this article, extending the model in these directions are
interesting questions for future research.
Appendix A
6.1 Numerical Implementation
The second order di¤erential equation is obtained by combining (1), (2), (3)
and the expression for @u@x to get
p00 (x) =
0BB@ [Qfu (x) + 1 (x = 0)M ] ct+t
(1 Q) fu (u (x))

p(x)  1
+1
p0(x)   ct+t
   2
1CCA (6)
p0 (x)2

1
1 + 
  p (x)
 1
suppressing z for convenience. Thus, su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium
given B (z) are the two equations (4) and (6).
We approximate the equilibrium by discretizing z into a 40 grid point
vector, corresponding to mean values in 40th fractiles of the population dis-
tribution of z. Equilibrium functions for other values of z are approximated
by interpolation and our simulation results are not sensitive to increasing the
number of gridspoints. Within each fractile, we solve the 2nd order ordinary
di¤erential equation in (6) for many values of x, where x  x (u). The ODE
algorithm is then initialized using p (x) = 0 and p0(x) =

1
1+

= (u  x),
cf. (1). For each value of x and z, we need a corresponding value of ;
the shadow value of increasing the budget size. However,  and x are not
separately identied. Therefore, we must take a heuristic approach, solving,
for each x; the ODE for many values of  until one is found that satises
the equilibrium conditions everywhere, particularly at x = u. In practice,
we do not merely guess repeatedly at ; but employ a search algorithm to
nd the  that satises (4); this provides a candidate  corresponding to a
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particular x that satisfy the FOC everywhere with a small error tolerance.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate an example of the set of solutions resulting
from the algorithm.
[Figures 10 and 11 about here]
When this algorithm has executed for all grid points of z; we can de-
termine the optimal budget allocation using the fact that, in an interior
solution,  must be equalized across di¤erent levels of z (the objective func-
tion is very steep for B (z) close to zero and quite at for large B (z) so
interior solutions for B (z) has been the relevant case for the solutions we
consider).
Equation (6) can be solved by standard numerical methods. We employ
a Runge-Kutta-type algorithm developed in Shampine (2009) which outper-
forms standard ODE algorithms in Matlab in terms of errors. However, two
main problems must be resolved. First, the discontinuity of E(ujx; z) at
x = 0 induces what is known as a singularityin the di¤erential equation.
We take a standard approach to this problem and approximate solutions for
which x > 0 by substituting the logical function 1 (x = 0) with a piecewise
cubic hermite interpolating polynomial. The resulting function displays a
relatively smooth transition from 0 to 1 in a small band around x = 0.
This band can be made very small, thus minimizing approximation errors
from this source. As it turns out, in our simulations, allowing x to ex-
ceed 0 is only relevant for the bottom and top fractiles where tax evasion
is abundant. Second, the ODE algorithm may fail to converge if we allow
the conditional density function to take values extremely close to 0 since
the ratio
fujz(x)
fujz(u(x))
may diverge toward innity. Therefore, we truncate the
domain of the conditional distributions where the densities are negligible.
Specically, we truncate the unrestricted conditional densities at the 0.5%
and 99.5% fractiles. The resulting supports of the conditional distributions
vary in z as illustrated in Figure 12.
[Figure 12 about here]
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6.2 Robustness
Tables 5-6 present comparative statics from varying key calculated parame-
ters, t, , and Q, while keeping xed the income distribution and the overall
audit budget.
Table 5 shows the mean level of evasion of tax evaders with the bench-
mark setting (t = 0:46,  = 1:06, and Q = 0:85) as index 100. Increases in
the penalty for tax evasion, , and the fraction of honest taxpayers, Q, leads
to lower mean evasion. The former e¤ect is very intuitive and works directly
through the rst order condition of taxpayers. The latter may seem less ob-
vious. Loosely speaking, a higher proportion of honest taxpayers results in
less bunching at the lower end of the conditional income distributions, ujz,
which makes it easier for the tax agency to detect evasion and less attractive
to evade. Changes in the tax rate, t, has practically no e¤ect on tax eva-
sion. Because penalties are proportional to evaded taxes, t does not enter
taxpayersrst order condition there is no substitution e¤ect as stressed
by Yitzhaki (1974). Risk neutrality of taxpayers further implies no income
e¤ect in the tax evasion gamble. Hence, the only implication of a tax hike
is an increase in revenue from taxes and penalties.
[Tab. 5 about here]
Although the three parameters, t, , and Q, a¤ect tax evasion, the co-
variance structure of tax rate bias and income composition is much less
a¤ected. In Table 6, we present the tax rate bias within and between audit
groups as measured by the OLS slope coe¢ cients from a regression of the
e¤ective tax rate bias on u, z, and a constant. Qualitatively, our conclu-
sions concerning the nature of the tax rate bias within and between audit
groups are una¤ected by parameter changes. The regressive bias within
audit groups and the progressive bias between audit groups are present in
all simulations. Further, the e¤ect of changing the value of a parameter is
symmetric throughout: a parameter change that increases (decreases) the
regressive bias also increases (decreases) the progressive bias and vice versa.
[Tab. 6 about here]
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Figures
Figure 1. Correlation Structure of E¤ective Average Tax Rates.
Statutory tax rate,  = t
E¤ective tax rate,  e
True income
(a) The Regressive Bias Result.
Statutory tax rate,  = t
    ei   
 e
True income
(b) Aggregation Across Audit
Groups.
 is the statutory average tax rate (here, constant at  = t), ei is the e¤ective average tax rate
within audit group i, and e is the aggregate e¤ective average tax rate.
Figure 2. Tax Collection in Denmark The Timing of Events.
Year t Year t+ 1
J F M A M J J   
Income is earned
Third parties report incomes
Pre-populated returns are sent out
Final returns are led
Audits
Time
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Figure 3. Progressive Bias in the Data for Tax Evaders: Between Audit Group
Variation.
The observations for the between-groups analysis are calculated as the expectation of     e¤
and third-party reported income (in 1,000 DKK), respectively, for each audit group. Audit
groups are approximated as 40th fractiles of third-party reported income.
Figure 4. Game Tree.
Nature Generates incomes from F (u; z)
Tax agency Selects audit strategy
Taxpayer
Tax agency Tax agency
Conducts audits
and ex post utility
is realized
Reports income
p1 pn
x11 xn1 x1n xnn
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Figure 5. Equilibrium Responses and Tax Bias.
(a) The Optimal Audit Schedule. (b) Evasion by True Income for Dishon-
est Taxpayers.
(c) Regressive Bias for Dishonest Tax-
payers. In this case, the statutory mar-
ginal tax rate is set to t = 0:5.
(d) Induced Reporting Behaviour. The
lower curve graphs the density of reports
by dishonest taxpayers, excluding the
mass point at x = u, while the upper
curve graphs the true income distribu-
tion.
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Figure 6. Empirical Distributions.
(a) The Proportion of Compliant Tax-
payers at u = 0.
(b) Conditional Densities, fujz.
The numbers in (a) indicate shares relative to the total mass of taxpayers in the audit group.
Figure 7. Mean Level of Evasion Across Audit Groups for Evaders, Data and
Simulation.
Red stars indicate data, green circles indicate simulated output. Third-party reported income is
measured in 1,000 DKK. The left-most data point is extreme due to a single taxpayer with
almost no third-party reported information that underreports a substantial amount.
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Figure 8. Budget Allocation.
(a) The Optimal Budget Allocation
Across Audit Groups.
(b) Share of Taxpayers with Flags
Across Audit Groups in Data.
In (a), the budget is allocated such that 3.45 percent of all taxpayers are audited. The
percentages shown denote the share of taxpayers within an audit group selected for audits.
Figure 9. E¤ective Tax Rate Bias Across Audit Groups, Data and Simulations.
Red stars indicate data, green circles indicate simulated output. Third-party reported income is
measured in 1,000 DKK.
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Figure 10. Examples of Optimal Audit Functions: p(xjz).
Figure 11. Shadow-Values of the Audit Budget, , in an Audit Group.
x (xbar) is dened as the lowest value of x that solves p(xj) = 0, i.e. the highest report of
dishonest taxpayers.
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Figure 12. The Support of u Across Audit Groups.
The conditional densities of ujz are truncated at the 0.5 and 99.5 percent fractiles of the
unrestricted conditional distributions. Residual income, u, and third-party reported income, z,
are measured in 1,000 DKK.
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Tables
Table 1. An Overview of the Danish Tax System, 2006.
Tax Tax base Bracket (DKK) Rate (pct.)
Labor market
tax
Labor income none 8.0
EITC Labor income up to 292,000 2.5
Bottom tax Personal income +
max(capital income; 0)
38,500 5.5
Middle tax  //  265,500 6.0
Top tax  //  318,700 15.0y
Local taxes Taxable income (= pers.
income + cap. income 
deductions)
38,500 33.3z
Stock income tax Stock income 0-44,300; 44,300- 28.0; 43.0
1 USD  5.5 DKK.
yThe top tax rate may be lowered by the tax ceiling that limits the sum of state
taxes (bottom, middle and top) and local taxes (excl. church taxes) to 59%. In the
average municipality the tax ceiling lowers the top rate by 0.08 percentage points.
zIn the avg. municipality and county incl. optional church tax of on avg. 0.74.
39
Table 2. Tax Compliance in Denmark, Income Year 2006
Reported
Income
Audit Adjustment Third-
Party
Re-
ported
Income
Self-
Reported
Income
Net adj. Under-
reporting
Over-
reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Income 193,277 1,664 1,825 -161 195,618 -2,341
(1,906) (480) (479) (22) (1,844) (584)
Total Tax 63,178 636 695 -59
(841) (246) (246) (9)
Income components
Earnings 156,127 672 683 -11 155,987 140
(2,275) (203) (203) (6) (2,217) (559)
Personal
Income
209,232 1,137 1,195 -58 209,726 -494
(1,950) (480) (479) (17) (1,886) (573)
Capital Income -10,884 142 198 -56 -11,308 424
(272) (27) (24) (11) (266) (81)
Deductions -9,264 143 213 -70 -5,605 -3,659
(178) (28) (26) (11) (85) (144)
Stock Income 3,612 239 262 -24 2,797 815
(546) (40) (39) (10) (502) (188)
Self-
Employment
103 21 23 -2 8 95
(60) (8) (8) (1) (4) (60)
Foreign Income 479 -18 6 -25 0 479
(92) (19) (4) (19) . (92)
Notes: The sample contains 10,740 taxpayers denoted as employees or recipients of public
transfers (unemployed, pensioners, etc.). Due to the stratication strategy employed
by SKAT, the sample contains 74.6% heavy taxpayers (i.e. with high-complexity tax
returns) and 25.4% light taxpayers, while the population has 32.6% heavy taxpayers
and 67.4% light taxpayers.
Net income is dened as personal income + capital income deductions + stock income
+ self-employment income + foreign income. In the Table, deductions are given as a
negative amount. Reported income is the sum of third-party reported income and self-
reported income. Standard errors of means in parentheses. All estimates are population
weighted.
All amounts in DKK (1 USD  5.5 DKK).
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Table 3. E¤ective Tax Rate Bias, Pooled, Within and Between Audit Groups.
Dependent Variable:     e¤ (in percentage points).
(1) (2)
True Income 0.0057
(0.89)
True Income Residual 0.0234***
(5.28)
Third-Party Rep. Inc. -0.0044*
(-2.52)
Constant 0.7787 3.1476***
(0.50) (6.47)
R2 0.0555 0.4381
Sample Size 905 905
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses calculated using
robust, stratied standard errors. Incomes (true,
residual and third-party reported) are measured in
1,000 DKKs.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
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Table 4. Calibration of Q, the Fraction of Honest Taxpayers
(1) (2)
Entire income reported by
third-parties
Some income not reported
by third-parties
A. Unweighted
Sample
Totals
Pop.
Weighted
Share
Unweighted
Sample
Totals
Pop.
Weighted
Share
# underreported 105 .010 796 .050
# correct 5210 .653 4148 .268
# overreported 27 .003 269 .016
Total reports 5342 .666 5213 .334
B. Unweighted
Sample
Totals
Pop.
Weighted
Share of
Sub-Sample
Unweighted
Sample
Totals
Pop.
Weighted
Share of
Sub-Sample
Correct reports 5210 .979 4148 .808
(.0021) (.0112)
Not underreporting 5237 .984 4417 .852
(.0019) (.0102)
Honesttaxpayers 5264 .989 4686 .895
(.0015) (.0089)
Assuming that unintentional underreporting is as frequent as unintentional overreporting.
I.e. # honest taxpayers (next to rightmost column) = 269 + 4148 + 269 = 4686.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All fractions and standard errors are calculated
subject to the stratication scheme. Unweighted totals are simply counted in the sample.
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Table 5. Comparative Statics Mean Evasion
t = 0:41
Q
 .80 .85 .90
0.81 112.0 105.6 100.1
1.06 105.4 99.9 95.0
1.31 101.4 96.3 91.7
t = 0:46
Q
.80 .85 .90
111.8 105.6 100.1
105.5 100 95.1
101.5 96.2 91.6
t = 0:51
Q
.80 .85 .90
111.8 105.6 100.1
105.4 100.0 95.0
101.5 96.4 91.8
Note: Index 100 = benchmark.
Table 6. Comparative Statics Tax Rate Bias Within and Between Audit
Groups
Tax Rate Bias Within Audit Groups
t = 0:41
Q
 .80 .85 .90
0.81 0.083 0.081 0.081
1.06 0.080 0.079 0.078
1.31 0.078 0.077 0.077
t = 0:46
Q
.80 .85 .90
0.093 0.091 0.090
0.090 0.089 0.088
0.088 0.087 0.086
t = 0:51
Q
.80 .85 .90
0.103 0.101 0.100
0.100 0.099 0.098
0.097 0.096 0.095
Tax Rate Bias Between Audit Groups
t = 0:41
Q
 .80 .85 .90
0.81 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
1.06 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008
1.31 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
t = 0:46
Q
.80 .85 .90
-0.013 -0.011 -0.010
-0.012 -0.010 -0.009
-0.010 -0.009 -0.008
t = 0:51
Q
.80 .85 .90
-0.014 -0.013 -0.011
-0.013 -0.011 -0.010
-0.012 -0.010 -0.009
Note: Tax rate biases are given as the OLS slope coe¢ cients from a regression of the
e¤ective tax rate bias on u (within), z (between) and a constant using approx. 100,000
observations of simulated data. All coe¢ cients are signicant on virtually any level.
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